Intervening in this process
by forbidding intermediate product price discrimination can have adverse consequences.
To illustrate this idea, section II presents a model of a single manufacturer who negotiates non-linear contracts with two retailers who subsequently compete in distribution. We solve for a "benchmark" equilibrium for the case of no government intervention.
Section III examines how alternative interpretations of the government's ban on price discrimination affect equilibrium pricing. While the precise meaning of secondary line price discrimination under Robinson-Patman is not given in the statute, the courts appear to have settled on the following. The Act is violated if 1) retailers are offered different payment schedules, or 2) retailers are offered the same payment schedule, but the discounts received by some retailers are not "functionally available" to all. Translating this interpretation into the implied restrictions on the set of bargaining instruments available in the model allows us to solve for the 'Robinson-Patman' equilibria. Our main finding is that forbidding intermediate goods price discrimination leads to higher marginal input prices for all buyers. In contrast to Katz, our model implies that, ceteris paribus,
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The failure to maximize joint profits in this case is due to a form of contractual incompleteness. The problem is that under bilateral bargaining, nonlinear contracts are insufficient to align incentives for bilateral opportunism with the goal of maximizing joint profits. Doing so requires retailers' payments to depend on their own and their rivals' actions (see O'Brien and Shaffer, 1992). There are many reasons why such contracts may not be feasible, ranging from the costs of enforcement to illegality under the antitrust statutes. 
II Model
We consider an intermediate goods market in which a single manufacturer produces a product at constant marginal cost c and sells it to two competing retailers for subsequent distribution to final consumers. The upstream monopoly assumption is made partly for tractability and partly to rule out apriori any primary line issues. In particular, we will not be concerned with issues of predatory pricing, or whether price discrimination fosters cartel instability. Thus, our welfare conclusions ignore these traditional concerns. The assumption of constant marginal cost dismisses any possible Robinson-Patman defense on cost justification grounds. 4 The restriction to two retailers is purely for expositional convenience. Like the constant marginal cost assumption, it can be generalized without altering any qualitative results.
Retailers are differentiated in the sense that although the product they sell is homogeneous, customers have different store preferences. Let consumer demands for the products of retailers 1 and 2 be Di(Pi, P 2 ), i = 1,2. We assume that demands are downward sloping, that the goods are substitutes, and that a unit increase in both prices causes the demand for good i to fall.
We consider a three-stage model of pricing and distribution. In the initial stage, the manufac-'One of the traditional criticisms of the Robinson-Patman Act is that discrimination under the law is not the same thing as economic discrimination. In theory, the Act allows for price differentials "which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery." In practice, however, the cost justification defense is generally recognised as a mirage. The inherent difficulty in determining economic costs and arbitrariness in allocating them to individual products makes for a very difficult trial defense. This paper abstracts from these difficulties by ruling out cost differences from the start. Turning to the details of the contracting process, we assume that when Robinson-Patman is not enforced, the manufacturer bargains simultaneously with each retailer in stage two. A variety of assumptions have been made in the literature about the details of bargaining in vertical control models like ours. The most common assumption is that the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, and offers take-it or leave-it two-part tariffs that are observed by both retailers before choosing final prices (i.e., stage two would be the same as stage one in our set-up). Under this assumption it is well known that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium yields a wholesale price vector wI that induces retailers to charge the vertically integrated retail price vector P 1 , and fixed fees that collect retailers' surplus.
7 A difficulty with using this approach to examine the effects of that simultaneously solve asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions between the manufacturer and each retailer. 8 To ensure that each Nash bargaining problem is well defined under our assumption that contracts are private information, we assume that the manufacturer and each retailer bargain taking the rival retailer's contract and retail price as given.
9 We will be more precise about how this concept embodies the idea of robustness against private renegotiation as we proceed. We will also discuss its foundations from noncooperative bargaining theory in subsection 11. 2 below.
The Nash bargaining problem of the manufacturer and retailer i is described by their disagreement points, (dMu, 0) , and by the convex set of payoff pairs, f2; = {(M, ;)IIru -dm, r; > 0). We assume the disagreement point dM, corresponds to the profit the manufacturer expects to earn if negotiations with retailer i break down. In this event, the manufacturer and rival retailer negotiate as bilateral monopolists according to their respective bargaining strengths.
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A set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions is a vector of wholesale prices and fixed fees that maximize the Nash products 4i = (rM -dmj)*(r;)(1-ad, i = 1,2, where as E (0,1) is a measure of the manufacturer's bargaining power in negotiations with retailer i. Differentiating 4; with respect to F; gives the pair of first order conditions
'The phrase "bargaining equilibrium" is due to Harsanyi (1977) , who considers the general problem of simultaneous bargaining by two-player coalitions in N-player bargaining games. Our definition is actually closer to that of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), who examined incentives for horizontal mergers by upstream and downstream firms when input prices are negotiated. The main difference between our definition and theirs is that they considered observable linear contracts, whereas we consider non-linear contracts that are private information.
'We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the need to clarify the assumptions defining the utility possibility frontier in each bilateral bargaining problem. "Under this assumption the Nash bargaining solution between the manufacturer and each retailer corresponds to the equilibrium of an alternating offer non-cooperative bargaining game in which firms are motivated to reach agreement by fears that negotiations may break down. Our qualitative results hold equally well when the disagreement point corresponds to the profit stream the manufacturer earns from firm j while in a state of disagreement with firm i. See Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) for the theoretical connection between non-cooperative bargaining and these two interpretations of the disagreement point in the Nash bargaining solution. The assumption in the text is made only to simplify computations in deriving explicit solutions to the model.
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Differentiating O; with respect to w;, using (1), and simplifying, gives the first order conditions
8D-
8D. D; (P;-c +(; -c) 0,i = 1,2, ji#i.
Optimal retailer pricing requires
Conditions (1), (2), and (3) are necessary for (wiwa, F l, F 2 , P 1 , P2) to arise in a bargaining equilibrium. Surprisingly, they yield the following strong prediction.
Proposition 1 When price discrimination is allowed, the bargaining equilibrium wholesale prices equal the manufacturer's marginal cost.
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Proof; Substituting equation (3) into (2), we see that setting wi = w2 = c satisfies (2). Thus, wi = w 2 = c is a solution to equations (2) and (3), and fixed fees can be chosen to satisfy (1). The appendix shows that marginal cost pricing is the only solution to 1-3. Q.E.D.
This conclusion is independent of a, and holds for any amount of demand asymmetry. Note that in addition to characterizing the bargaining equilibrium wholesale prices, equation (2) is the first order condition for choosing a wholesale price wi to maximize the bilateral profits rM --i of the manufacturer and retailer i. Since wholesale prices equal marginal cost in any bargaining equilibrium, it follows that if either wholesale price is different than marginal cost, the manufacturer and at least one retailer can negotiate a different wholesale price that will increase their joint surplus. This verifies our earlier assertion that the bargaining equilibrium concept embodies the idea of robustness against private renegotiation.Ya
Despite their best efforts, neither retailer in this model gains a marginal cost advantage over its rival in equilibrium." They both end up negotiating wholesale prices equal to production marginal cost. This does not mean that the resulting retail prices are the same (since demands may be asymmetric), nor does it mean that the average prices paid for the manufacturer's product are the same. Each retailer's average price is determined by the quantity it buys in equilibrium and its fixed fee. The fixed fee, in turn, depends inter alia on relative bargaining powers. Suppose, for example, that retailer 2 is a large chain store and retailer 1 is a small independently owned concern.
"The intuition is precisely the same when downstream firms are Cournot competitors. Hart and Tirole (1990) and McAfee and Schwartz (1993) show that marginal cost input pricing arises in that case as well.
"One might argue that the need to develop a reputation might prevent the upstream arm from engaging in this type of opportunism. But reputation alone is not always enough, especially for young upstream firms. For example, retailers may believe that the upstream firm will not be around long enough to reap the benefits of building a reputation. Even for experienced firms, if downstream orders are infrequent, the short term gains from making private offers may outweigh the value of building a reputation. Another problem arises if retailers have difficulty distinguishing opportunism from exogenous fluctuations in market conditions. In this case a supplier may simply be unable to build a reputation. Finally, it is clear that reputation does not work in every case from the complex franchise contract law on disclosure and dealer termination.
"We have abstracted from several considerations that could give one buyer lower marginal prices. First, the manufacturer may have a lower marginal cost of selling to one buyer than another. If so, then each buyer would receive its good at the marginal cost of serving it. Second, retailers may differ in their degrees of risk aversion. For example, a retailer that is more risk averse may negotiate a lower fixed payment in exchange for a higher wholesale price. Third, some buyers may be compensated at the margin for performing tasks that are traditionally reserved for wholesalers. We leave these extensions for future research, but note here that as long as the engendered cost advantage is small enough, our qualitative results will continue to hold.
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Then there are two factors that may tend to give the chain a lower average price. First, because of its size, the large chain can spread its fixed cost over a greater quantity than can its smaller rival.
Second, the chain store is likely to have more bargaining power than the smaller store and hence may be able to negotiate a lower fixed fee.s
Notice that since ws = wa = c, bargaining equilibrium retail prices are the same as would be chosen by vertically integrated duopolists who each produce at marginal cost c. These prices generally fall well short of joint profit maximizing levels.'
6 The bargaining equilibrium outcome is about as competitive as one could hope for. Proposition 1 implies that retail monopsony power suffices to block completely market power at the manufacturing stage from being passed on to consumers.
Noncooperative foundations of bargaining equilibria.
We close this section by briefly describing two noncooperative games that yield bargaining equilibria as solutions.' 7 Consider first the simple bargaining game in which a single upstream firm makes private take-it or leave-it offers to multiple retailers who then compete by simultaneously choosing retail prices. As pointed out by several authors,' 8 this game and its Cournot variant have multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria owing to the arbitrary nature of retailers' out-of-equilibrium beliefs about offers received by their rivals. Two approaches have been suggested to deal with this problem.
One approach is to require equilibria to be immune not only from profitable deviations by individual "in general, the size of the discount a retailer can negotiate is increasing in its threat point, the inverse of its discount rate, and its cost of making bargaining concessions. Thus, a chain store may obtain a lower average price than a smaller independent store because it has better alternatives in the event negotiations break down, it has a higher discount rate, or it is more costly for it to accept a higher price.
"'6oint profit maximization requires wholesale prices in excess of marginal cost in order to induce retailers to internalize the effects of their rivalry.
"This exercise is in the spirit of what has become known as "the Nash program," which refers to the idea whose origins can be traced to Nash (1953) that the choice of axioms in cooperative approaches to the bargaining problem should be guided by noncooperative games that explicitly model players' bargaining moves. Binmore (1985) has suggested that, "operationally, this means that cooperative solution concepts need to be firmly rooted in noncooperative theory in the sense that the concept should be realizable as the solution of at least one interesting and relevant noncooperative bargaining game (and preferably of many such bargaining games)."
"See Hart and Tirole (1990) , O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1993) . An alternative approach to the multiplicity problem is to place restrictions on retailers' outof-equilibrium beliefs. The "market-by-market bargaining" restriction of Hart and Tirole (1990) and the "passive beliefs" restriction of McAfee and Schwartz (1993) require that retailers view unexpected offers by the manufacturer as unilateral deviations. Under this restriction, the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the take-it or leave-it game yields a bargaining equilibrium in which the manufacturer receives all the rents. Intuitively, unilateral deviation beliefs force equilibria to be immune from profitable bilateral deviations by the manufacturer and each retailer.
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The take-it or leave-it game can be generalized to an infinite horizon bargaining game in which the manufacturer and each retailer alternate offers each period until reaching agreement or until negotiations break down. Briefly, suppose the manufacturer makes private offers to both retailers "A related idea is the "strong equilibrium" concept of Aumann (1959), which requires immunity from profitable deviations by any coalition of players. Weakening this to allow deviations only by individuals and coalitions of firms that contract with each other yields a contract equilibrium in our model. "One might think that the manufacturer's offer to retailer i might signal the offer (or set of reasonable offers) it has made to retailer j. If so, this could reduce the set of "reasonable" equilibria. Unfortunately, the refinements in the literature that deal with the signalling problem under imperfect information (e.g., the "intuitive criterion" and others implied by "strategic stability" (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986)), have little power in our model, even in the take-it or leave-it framework. The difficulty can be seen by observing that Kohlberg and Mertens' "never a weak best response" (NWBR) criterion for pruning inferior strategies with the hope of eliminating equilibria that are not part of stable sets does not prune many strategies at all in our model. For example, one type of equilibrium to the take-it or leave-it game has the manufacturer offer the wholesale price vector w that induces retailers to set the vertically integrated price vector PI, and a fixed fee vector FI that collects both retailers' surplus. This equilibrium can be supported by each retailer's strategy of charging P' whenever offered the contract it expects and rejecting any other offer. The NWBR formulation of stability states that an equilibrium outcome must remain an equilibrium outcome when a strategy is deleted which is inferior (i.e., not a best reply) at every equilibrium with that outcome. Now if it were true that all offers to retailer j other than uo were inferior at every equilibrium with the vertically Integrated outcome, then one could eliminate those strategies and show that the manufacturer could gain by deviating, since in the new game retailer i would then effectively have unilateral deviation beliefs. However, there are equilibria that yield the vertically integrated outcome in which offering 'sb 9 Ej is a weak best reply for the manufacturer to the retailers' equilibrium strategies. In one of these equilibria, retailer i rejects any offer that does not include w; and charges P' if it receives the offer it expects; retailer j rejects any offer that does not include uj or dj and charges Pi when offered either wj or sb, along with a fixed fee that it expects will extract all its surplus. Similar arguments make it clear that stability does not significantly reduce the set of equilibria in this game. 
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Based on this interpretation, we consider two cases. In the first case, the manufacturer must charge a common wholesale price and cannot specify a fixed fee. In the second case, the manufacturer is allowed to charge a common fixed fee in addition to a common wholesale price. The second case is permitted provided the degree of asymmetry among retailers is small enough. We also consider a third case which practically may arise because of information constraints. In some situations the courts may simply not be able to verify discriminatory fixed fees. Thus, in our third case, although the manufacturer must charge a common wholesale price, the fixed fees are determined through bargaining.
The timing in our model is the same as before. In the initial stage, the manufacturer publicly announces its supply terms. However, these terms are now subject to legal restrictions. Bargaining, if any, takes place in stage two, and retail prices are chosen in stage three. We assume that bargaining can arise only in case three, i.e., only when the courts cannot verify discriminatory fixed fees, and then only over the fixed payment. We do not allow bargaining over the wholesale price.
Our justification for this assumption is the clause in section 2f of the Robinson-Patman Act which makes it illegal for a buyer "knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price." In other words, retailers in our model refrain from renegotiating the wholesale price because if they were successful, they would be held liable for inducing illegal price discrimination. The manufacturer obviously prefers that there be no bargaining over the wholesale price and has every incentive to remind retailers of their liability under section 2f. 25 We begin by solving the retailers' pricing problem, the stage of the game that is common to each of the three cases. Each retailer chooses its price P;, to maximize zr = (P; -w)Di(PIP2), 2t An alternative assumption, which we do not make, is that retailers can negotiate over the wholesale price, cogsnisant of the fact that if anyone is successful in obtaining a discount, the lower wholesale price is then granted to their rivals as well. The disadvantage of this alternative assumption is that it requires a more complete specification of the bargaining process, and would at best only mitigate the welfare problem we identify, without altering our qualitative conclusions. Intuitively, bargaining over the wholesale price loses much of its appeal to buyers who know that they cannot gain a marginal cost advantage. Adding to this is the fact that the manufacturer will be more reticent to grant wholesale price concessions precisely because he knows that they must be given to all buyers. Both of these factors lead to a higher wholesale price when discrimination is forbidden than when it is allowed. 
where the superscript CF is a pneumonic aid for 'common fee'. Differentiating rCF with respect to w, using (4), and simplifying gives the first order condition
Since dP2/dw > 0, 8D 5 /8P 2 > 0, and D(P*) -Di(P*) -0, the left hand.side of (6) is positive when evaluated at w = c.27 Assuming the objective function is quasi-concave in w, 2 8 the wholesale price is higher when discrimination is forbidden than when it is allowed. Let wCF denote the equilibrium wholesale price. Substituting into the final stage equilibrium retail prices gives PCF -P;*(wCF) > Pe(c), for i = 1,2.
Proposition 3 When the Robinson-Patman Act requires a common wholesale price and fized fee,
and when the two-part tariff must be functionally available to all (D 2 (P*) -Di(P*) 0), both retail prices are strictly greater than when price discrimination is allowed.
2T
More formally, a sufficient condition for the left hand side of (6) to be positive, when evaluated at w = c, is that sales of the less profitable retailer be less than sales of the more profitable retailer. For N > 2 retailers, the generalization of the sufficient condition is that sales of the least profitable retailer be less than the average sales across all retailers. a"The objective is quasi-concave, e.g., under linear demand.
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Intuitively, because the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits retailers from knowingly inducing discriminatory prices, the wholesale price is not bargained down to marginal cost. Instead, the manufacturer unilaterally sets its wholesale price above marginal cost in order to internalize downstream competition, and thereby drive retail prices closer to their joint profit maximizing levels.2" Consumers are unambiguously worse off as a result.
I.3 Common wholesale price, discriminatory fixed fees.
The last scenario we consider is not so much a new interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act as it is a recognition of an information constraint on the ability of the courts and retailers to ascertain price discrimination violations. One possibility is that the courts can verify wholesale prices, but not discriminatory fixed fees, which may take the form of under-the-table payments, rebates, or other allowances that are difficult to uncover. In this case, a disadvantaged retailer simply cannot prove a discriminatory fixed fee violation of Robinson-Patman. Another possibility is that the courts can verify fixed fees if called upon to do so, but the system is costly, and a retailer may not know for sure whether it has been disadvantaged. For example, suppose retailers can only infer discrimination when they observe "surprise" retail prices by their rivals. Any rival who receives discriminatory terms can hide this fact by setting its retail price equal to what it would set in the absence of any favoritism. By doing so, it avoids detection. In either case, the Robinson-Patman Act serves only to ensure stability in retail prices, not equity in surplus extraction.
We model this situation by assuming that the manufacturer must choose a common wholesale price, but that fixed fees are determined through secret bilateral bargaining.3e This case differs from the previous two in that now the bargaining stage of the model matters. We proceed to 2 5 lf the two-part tariff is not required to be functionally available to all, the manufacturer has to balance its desire to internalize downstream competition with the possibility that sales of the less profitable retailer will be hurt more at the margin than sales of the more profitable retailer. This caveat arises because when the manufacturer is restricted to a common fixed fee, it cannot fully extract the surplus of the more profitable retailer. where the superscript DF is a pneumonic aid for 'discriminatory fee'.
Proceeding backwards, in the initial stage the manufacturer chooses w to maximize its profit, knowing how its decision will subsequently affect fixed fee negotiations in stage two and retail pricing decisions in stage three. Differentiating (7) with respect to w, using (4), and simplifying gives the first order condition
Since dP'/dw > 0 and 8D;/OPj > 0, j 0 i, a sufficient condition for the left hand side of (8) to be positive when evaluated at w = c is that the derivative of the manufacturer's disagreement point with respect to w be nonnegative. Under our interpretation of the disagreement point as the profit the manufacturer can expect to earn if negotiations with retailer i break down, the derivative is zero. 3 ' Hence, assuming the objective function is quasi-concave in w, the wholesale price will be higher when price discrimination is forbidden than when it is allowed. Let wDF denote the equilibrium wholesale price. Substituting into the final stage equilibrium retail prices gives PDF P(wDF) > P(c) for i = 1,2. closer substitutes (7 increasing), the welfare loss under the discriminatory and common fee cases increases, while the welfare loss decreases in the no fee case. At 7 = 0, the welfare loss is 0%, 3.6%, and 41.5% respectively. At 7 = 5, the welfare loss is 23.4%, 23.7%, and 31.2%. Intuitively, the discriminatory and common fee cases yield similar welfare results because the retailers are close to symmetric in the example. Nevertheless, the discriminatory fee case is always preferable to the common fee case and yields zero welfare loss at the polar extreme where the retailer's products are independent (7 = 0). By contrast, the double markup in the no fee case is exacerbated as retailers' products become less substitutable (7 decreasing). On the other hand, as retailers' products become more substitutable (y increasing), all three cases converge in the limit to maximize joint profit (not shown). But the welfare loss associated with joint profit maximization (25%) is still substantial when compared to the competitive benchmark.
V Conclusion
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to limit the purchasing power of large retail chain stores. Few have questioned its basic intent. Instead, most criticism deals with primary line issues of predatory pricing, barriers to entry, and cartel stability, as well as practical difficulties in enforcing the Act, such as the lack of an adequate cost justification defense (often deemed illusory), and the inevitable impediments to distributional efficiency engendered by preventing retailers integrated into wholesaling from being compensated by the manufacturer for their services.?
So substantial was the early criticism that gradually a broad consensus emerged that intermediate goods price discrimination should not be proscribed. Reflecting this view, public enforcement was "slowly anesthetized" through the 1970 's (Dixon, 1975 Despite the historical and renewed importance of secondary line protection under RobinsonPatman, the welfare effects of forbidding discriminatory discounts have only recently begun to be the subject of formal economic modeling.
However, this literature does not incorporate bargaining or nonlinear pricing, two practices that are pervasive in many intermediate goods markets. When they are included, the analysis of secondary line price discrimination is altered in a crucial way. For "See Schwartz (1986) for an excellent summary of these issues.
"According to Scherer (1990) '"Recent articles include DeGraba (1987) and (1990) in addition to Katz (1987) . In contrast to our paper, each tends to find that secondary line price discrimination is welfare reducing. Price discrimination is harmful in DeGraba (1987) because it induces local firms to overly differentiate its product. It is harmful in DeGraba (1990) because it leads retailers to distort their choice of production technology in an inefficient way. Katz (1987) finds that price discrimination is welfare reducing unless it prevents inefficient backward integration. 
